Historically, the economic value that nursing brings to the patient care process has not been recognized or quantified. Improving the quality of nursing care through work environment changes or increases in staffing is viewed by many as an added cost, but the benefits in terms of money saved through improved nursing satisfaction and patient outcomes are not considered. . Recommendations are to conduct research on the impact of policy and payment changes on the nursing workforce and quality of care and to correct the misalignment of socioeconomic and business case incentives for quality by payment systems and other changes.
A s quality and cost control remain concerns in health care delivery, and as health care payment systems evolve toward pay for performance (P4P), it is important to consider the role of nurses in providing cost-effective, high-quality care. Historically, the economic value that nursing brings to the patient care process has not been recognized or quantified. Improving the quality of nursing care through work environment changes or increases in staffing is viewed by many as an added cost, but the benefits in terms of money saved through improved nursing satisfaction and patient outcomes are not considered. Aside from a few studies calculating the cost savings from improved patient outcomes attributed to nursing care (e.g., Cho, Ketefian, Barkauskas, & Smith, 2003; Dimick, Swoboda, Pronovost, & Lipsett, 2001; Needleman, Buerhaus, Stewart, Zelevinsky, & Mattke, 2005) , the "business case" for quality nursing care has yet to be made.
Perhaps part of the reason why nursing care is not connected to financial outcomes is that health care reimbursement systems have historically paid for hospital nursing care on a fixed cost basis by rolling costs up into "room and board" (Thompson & Diers, 1991) . These payment systems do not account for the variable time nurses spend with different patients or for their efforts in providing care to different types of patients. For example, diagnosis related group (DRG) weights, used to determine Medicare hospital payment amounts, have been shown to be only weakly correlated with the amount of nursing care associated with caring for hospitalized patients (Welton & Halloran, 2005) . Because nursing care consumes 30% of the total hospital operating budget and 44% of direct care costs, the cost compression of nursing care in the DRG payment system leads to a significant distortion of economic value of nursing care and therefore a significant underrepresentation of the amount and quality of nursing care needed (Kane & Siegrist, 2002) .
These are important concerns especially given the movement toward P4P. If nursing care constitutes a significant amount of the performance being rewarded, knowing the contribution of nursing to that performance is important. As P4P moves into the hospital arena, the main caregivers in hospitals-the nursing workforce-will be the frontline people responsible for meeting quality targets. Yet how nursing care fits into the targets, indicators, and financial rewards of P4P is unknown. Will P4P systems meet the intended goal of improving quality? How should P4P be constructed so that targets and indicators include those achievable by the nursing workforce? Will P4P put further strains on the nursing workforce? These questions pose serious challenges to designing P4P systems in hospitals that will engage and reward nurses for their efforts.
These issues in paying for quality nursing care raise three related policy considerations:
• If it can be shown that improving nursing care contributes not only to better patient outcomes but also to healthy financial performance, it will help make the case for strengthening nurse staffing and making other work place improvements. • If billing for the actual nursing resources used in the delivery of nursing care (the "intensity of nursing care") makes a difference in hospital reimbursement, then paying hospitals for nursing intensity would be more rational than our current system and could lead to more accurate payment (Welton, Fischer, DeGrace, & Zone-Smith, 2006) . A "nursing intensity billing model" could be a basis for payers and providers to explore a reworking of payment systems so that they account for nursing care. Such a model could also allow nurse administrators in hospitals to make the case for better staffing according to patient needs, potentially leading to improved patient outcomes at a lower overall cost of care. • Because so little is known about whether P4P will achieve stated goals of improving quality and what the impact will be on nursing, nursing leaders are called on to lead the way in finding answers to these questions and in promoting policies that will lead to positive change.
This issue of Policy, Politics, & Nursing Practice (PPNP) discusses these economic issues and policies regarding paying for quality nursing care. It features nine articles that were originally presented at the Economics of Nursing Invitational Conference held at the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation in Princeton, New Jersey, June 13 and 14, 2007 (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, n.d.; Unruh & Hassmiller, 2007) . The articles are grouped around three topics related to paying for quality nursing care: (a) making the business case for quality nursing care, (b) reimbursing for nursing care, and (c) paying for performance related to nursing care.
Introducing all of these topics in the first article, "Economics of Nursing," Linda Aiken, PhD, FAAN, FRCN, RN (director, Center for Health Outcomes and Policy Research, University of Pennsylvania), writes that there is growing evidence that nurses significantly contribute to quality outcomes and that this can create offsets, or cost savings. However, most health care managers are not familiar with the evidence linking nursing with quality and cost savings. Nursing is considered a cost rather than revenue, which makes nursing a target for cost reductions. Policies such as hospital reimbursement affect nurse supply, demand, workload, and retention, but they are generally made without consideration of workforce impact. In addition, nurses are not currently a focus of P4P, and there are few examples of payment incentives that reward nurses for higher productivity and quality or cost savings. Dr. Aiken recommends that we conduct research on the impact of policy and payment changes on the nursing workforce and quality of care and educate and motivate health care leaders to act on the basis of evidence in their management decisions. Nursing would do well, she concludes, if it "combines its quest for holistic and patient-centered care with sciencebased advocacy and evidence-based skepticism about any kind of reform that does not fundamentally change the organization and culture of health care" (p. 78).
The next two articles focus on linking investments in nursing with quality and cost savings-the "business case for quality nursing care." Jack Needleman, PhD (associate professor, Department of Health Services, University of California, Los Angeles School of Public Health), believes that the difficulty with showing a business case for nursing care is that the incentives for doing so at the institutional level are low. He asks, "Is What's Good for the Patient Good for the Hospital?" Needleman starts by drawing a distinction among (a) the business case, in which the intervention is valued from the financial perspective of the entity that will bear its costs; (b) the economic case, in which the financial returns do not need to accrue to the institution bearing the costs; and (c) the social case, in which the value of the intervention is considered without weighing it by its costs. The issue is that a quality initiative may meet social and/or broad economic goals because it improves outcomes and/or saves money in the health care system overall, but if the cost savings are not captured by that institution it may not meet the business case goal of the institution bearing the costs.
Needleman reviews the evidence for the positive impact of nursing care on several patient outcomes. Relating prior research, he compares the costs of providing a level of staffing that reduces patient adverse events to the cost offsets of those reductions. He finds that increasing the proportion of registered nurses (RNs) without increasing RN hours produces a net economic cost savings and that a reduction in patient length of stay is one of the primary reasons why there are cost savings. Although there are cost savings on the broad economic level, on the institutional level the business case for higher staffing is not as strong. A hospital will not be able to capture all of the cost savings from higher staffing, because a proportion of its reimbursement occurs on a per diem (daily) basis, so a shorter patient length of stay because of higher staffing may reduce costs, but it also reduces revenue. Needleman concludes that the misalignment of social-economic and business case incentives needs to be corrected by payment system and other changes.
In the following article, "The Business Case for Nursing in Long-Term Care," Susan Horn, PhD (vice president, research, International Severity Information Systems, Inc., Institute for Clinical Outcomes Research) looks at these issues in the long-term care sector. In her study, Horn uses data from the National Pressure Ulcer Long-Term Care Study. She finds that more RN direct care time per resident day is associated with fewer pressure ulcers, hospitalizations, and urinary tract infections. Using Needleman's distinction above among social, economic, and business cases, there is an annual net social benefit of greater RN time of $3,191 per resident but an annual net cost of $1,995.
One problem with making the business case for investments in nursing is that the value of nursing is not quantified. The next set of five articles discusses the fact that hospital reimbursement systems have historically paid for hospital nursing care on a fixed-cost basis by rolling costs up into "room and board" and that these payment systems make nursing care invisible and do not account for the variable time and effort in caring for different patients. In their article, Laport et al. present a typology of nursing care adjustment methods based on a review of practices of several countries. They write that there are two main reasons for accounting for nursing care. The first is for cost-accounting purposes, and the second is for managerial purposes. Using nursing intensity to adjust cost-accounting systems such as DRGs has been called into question since one study found that adjustments would not change DRG weights by more than 1% (Cromwell & Price, 1988) . The authors believe that more research is necessary regarding this finding. However, they believe that using nursing intensity measurement for managerial purposes is the most important as this aids in the allocation of nursing resources.
Laport and colleagues report that in most countries nursing hours do not influence DRG-like reimbursement schemes. In the United States, starting with the work of John Thompson in the late 1970s, there have been a few unsuccessful attempts so far to add nursing components to DRG weights. The few countries that do use some form of nursing adjustment to DRGs are Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Switzerland, and Belgium. Belgium's adjustment for nursing care involves a fixed nursing cost based on minimum nursing staffing ratios, plus a variable nursing intensity component.
In their article, Welton and Dismuke present research evidence that DRG systems need to account for nursing intensity. Without an adjustment for nursing intensity, DRG weights display "cost compression" and do not predict patient length of stay or charges as well as those that do. They advocate adjusting DRG weights for the intensity of nursing care. This can be done using a nursing intensity billing model adapted from Thompson's original ideas. Welton and Dismuke test this model using patientlevel administrative data from 286 hospitals in four states and finds that a nursing intensity adjustment to DRG weights improves total explained cost variance by 8.5% for all payer patients and 9.4% for Medicare patients. In the future, combing administrative data with data collection might produce an even stronger effect.
In responding to both Laport et al. and Welton and Dismuke Steven Finkler, PhD, CPA (professor, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University), asks why nursing is not a separate cost center, like the lab or X-ray. His answer, in "Measuring and Accounting for the Intensity of Nursing Care: Is It Worthwhile?" is that it is because of the difficulty of assigning differential costs based on nursing care. It is easy to know that a patient had an X-ray or a particular lab test done, but nurses do many different things to many patients in the course of a shift, and tracking each of those activities would be costly, so costly that the expense of collecting information might be more than the value of the added information. So, Finkler feels, before we begin to push for improved data collection and modification of the DRG system, we need to better explain why these changes are needed and to see that the costs of the system will not outweigh the value of the added information.
Along the lines of Finkler, Paul Ginsburg, PhD (president, Center for Studying Health System Change), asks "What will motivate payers to incorporate nursing intensity into hospital payment?" in his article titled "Paying Hospitals on the Basis of Nursing Intensity: Policy and Political Considerations." Because recent DRG changes have involved "leveling the playing field," the motivating factor will be evidence that hospitals are specializing in DRGs of high or low nursing intensity, thus indicating a need to change the reimbursement system to make it more rational. At first blush, because the Cromwell and Price (1988) study does not indicate major differences in DRG weights with a nursing intensity adjustment, it is unlikely that hospitals are using the omission to capitalize on certain patient groups. The hospital industry has changed significantly since the Cromwell study, however, so it is possible that new data would have different results.
The final article on nursing intensity billing, written by Eileen Sullivan-Marx, PhD, CRNP, FAAN (Shearer Endowed Chair for Health Community Practices, University of Pennsylvania School of Nursing), discusses the history and status of reimbursement of advance practice nurses (APNs). In "Lessons Learned From Advanced Practice Nursing Payment," she writes that APNs waged a 30-year battle to win the ability to charge Medicare for their services, which was successful in 1997. APNs can now directly bill Medicare under Part B. Payment is figured using the same Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS) reimbursement system used for physician payment and using the same Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes. Sullivan-Marx discusses the mechanisms involved in RBRVS payment. Intensity of provider care is included in the CPT code as a combination of several factors, including mental and physical effort, knowledge, skill, and stress. Other ways of measuring intensity in the RBRVS system and limitations of existing ways are discussed. As mentioned by Laport et al. and Welton and Dismuke, with regard to DRGs, Sullivan-Marx reveals that payment for CPT codes using the RBRVS also results in cost compression in some areas. She concludes by raising current challenges that include providing evidence-based data on nurse work and outcomes for the emerging P4P systems. Lessons learned from the work on nursing intensity in DRGs and RBRVS will be helpful in moving forward.
Issues with P4P are discussed in an article by Sean Clarke, PhD, RN, FAAN (associate director, Center for Health Outcomes and Policy Research, University of Pennsylvania), Carol Raphael, MPA (president and CEO of the Visiting Nurse Service of New York), and Joanne Disch, PhD, RN, FAAN (professor and director, Densford International Center for Nursing Leadership, University of Minnesota, and chair, AARP Board of Directors). The title of the article is "Challenges and Directions for Nursing in the Pay-for-Performance Movement." Some possible problems with P4P, the authors write, are that financially troubled hospitals treating large numbers of vulnerable patients could receive poor performance scores, receive lower payments, and be further strained financially. Other concerns are that the P4P quality indicators tend to be narrow process indicators that do not capture the real quality of care, especially nursing care. Also, hospitals can "perform to the indicators" rather than improve quality.
Although little is known about how P4P will affect clinical and financial performance of health care organizations, even less is known about its impacts on nursing. Hospital nurses are already involved in pay for reporting requirements of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), will soon be working under CMS payment exclusions for hospital-acquired complications such as falls and pressure ulcers, and are projected to eventually be a part of P4P systems. One possible effect on of nurses these requirements is that documentation burdens could go up. Another concern is that the quality measures will not capture nursing care. On the other hand, a P4P system could provide nursing-sensitive quality data, and the linkage of these data to nursing care could provide the evidence for investments in nursing services. Requirements to perform certain treatments and evaluations under P4P could lead to implementing highquality nursing practice settings.
A section in this article addresses the actions that the Visiting Nurse Services of New York and other home health agencies are taking to deal with P4P systems. Home health agencies have invested in information technologies and have developed systems that transform data collected at the point of care into required indicators. When indicators are outside an acceptable range, organizational mechanisms exist to make needed improvements. Data are also used for benchmarking, trending, and other research.
A final section in this article reminds us not to forget the patient when it comes to P4P. What is most important to consumers? If patients were paying for performance, what would they pay for? The authors answer that patients would be less likely to push for "decontextualized measures of adherence to specific practice elements" and more likely to want "correct, safe treatments that respect their personal preferences and help them attain the best functioning" (p. 133).
The articles in this issue point to several research needs. First, ongoing research regarding nurse staffing and patient outcomes needs to be broadened to include nursing care factors other than staffing (e.g., education, experience), and these nursing factors need to be related to not only patient but also financial outcomes. Second, the integration of nursing intensity weights (NIWs) into hospital payment systems needs to be explored both in terms of the most accurate yet least costly way of ascertaining nursing intensity and also in terms of whether it makes a big enough difference in payment variability to be worth the effort. However, as Laport et al. write, having an NIW measurement is important more for managerial reasons than payment reasons. Perhaps if NIW fails to pass the test for the former, it will still be important for the latter. Finally, more research on nursing-sensitive process and outcome indicators will provide information to help integrate nursing care into P4P systems.
These article also point to some policy recommendations. For sure, we need to translate and disseminate the evidence we have now and in the future regarding the value of nursing. Because key components of quality are the ratios, proportions, and educational levels of nurses, we should promote legislation to increase the supply of nurses and nurse educators. Depending on research results, we may want to push for redesign of the DRG system to account for the intensity of nursing care. Finally, we may want to advocate adding the 15 NQF (2006) nursing-sensitive measures to existing P4P measures, as well as other indicators that the research indicates is appropriate.
